Concepts, Agents, and Coalitions in Alternating Time

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Abstract. We consider a combination of the strategic logic ATL with the description logic ALCO. In order to combine the logics in a flexible way, we assume that every individual can be (potentially) an agent. We also take the novel approach to teams by assuming that a coalition has an identity on its own, and hence its membership can vary. In terms of technical results, we show that the logic does not have the finite model property, though ATL and ALCO do. We conjecture that the satisfiability problem may be undecidable. On the other hand, model checking of the combined logic is decidable and even tractable. Finally, we define a particular variant of realizability that combines satisfiability of ALCO with model checking of the ATL dimension, and we show that this new problem is decidable.

1 Introduction

Description logics (DLs) are logical formalisms for representing the knowledge of an application domain in a structured way [4]. More precisely, DLs allow to describe classes, assign individuals to these classes, and define binary relations on individuals. The importance of DLs lies in the fact that comprise the formal basis of the Semantic Web ontology languages [6], and they have well developed practical decision procedures. On the other hand, alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [3] is probably the most influential logic of strategic ability that has emerged in recent years. In this paper, we propose a product-style combination of ATL with the description logic ALCO. An obvious motivation is to extend ATL with limited first-order component for reasoning about individuals (objects in the world). Alternatively, one can see it as extending the description logic ALCO with means to explicitly reason about what the actors in the system can achieve over time. We call the resulting language alternating-time description logic (ADL).

ADL allows to specify how agents/coalitions can change the properties of the external world, but also how they influence their own characteristics. To some extent this was already present in [10] but that formalism was limited in two respects. First, by using coalition logic (CL) rather than ATL for reasoning about the outcome of agents’ actions, specifications were restricted to properties that can be enforced in the next moment (or, in a fixed and pre-specified number of steps). This was a serious limitation since most interesting properties refer to patterns that persist over time: either as invariants (specifying e.g. safety conditions of the system) or in terms of reachability (specifying e.g. goals that should be eventually achieved).

Secondly, unlike in [11] where the sets of agents and objects (individuals) were rigidly separated, or in [10] where agents were assumed a special kind of individuals that had to be “called by name”, we want to allow here for flexible specifications of coalitions, so that the advantages of description logics are really used. To this end, we assume that coalitions are just concepts, and they are specified in the same way as any other concept. Since concepts are semantically sets of individuals, this suggests that any individual can be an agent, at least potentially. That poses some important semantic issues, as now the number of agents can become infinite. We also take the novel approach to modeling teams by assuming that a coalition has an identity on its own, and hence its membership can vary.

In terms of technical results, we show that the logic is strictly more expressive than ATL, ALCO, and CL_{ALCO}. On the other hand, it does not have the finite model property, though ATL, ALCO, as well as CL_{ALCO} do. We conjecture that the satisfiability problem may be undecidable. On the other hand, model checking of the combined logic is decidable and even tractable (in the size of the input). Finally, we define a particular variant of realizability that combines satisfiability of ALCO with model checking of the ATL dimension, and we show that this new problem is decidable.

2 Preliminaries

We begin by a short presentation of the logics ATL and ALCO.

2.1 Alternating-time Temporal Logic

ATL [3] is a generalization of the branching-time logic CTL, in which path quantifiers are replaced with so called cooperation modalities ⟨⟨⟩⟩. Formula ⟨⟨⟩⟩γ expresses that coalition A has a collective strategy to enforce property γ. Formally, the language of ATL is given by the following grammar:

\[ \varphi ::= p \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \land \varphi \mid \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle X \varphi \mid \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle G \varphi \mid \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle \varphi U \varphi \]

where p is an atomic proposition from a countable set Prop = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots\}. Typically, coalitions in ATL formulae are given by listing the names of their members. Cooperation modalities are followed by standard temporal operators: X (next), G (always), U (until). Additionally, F (sometime in the future) can be defined as:

\[ \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle F \varphi \equiv \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle \top U \varphi. \]

The semantics of ATL is defined in a variant of transition systems where transitions are labeled with combinations of actions, one per agent. Formally, a concurrent game structure (CGS) is a tuple

\[ M = \langle Ag, St, V, Act, d, o \rangle \]

which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Ag = \{1, \ldots, k\}, a nonempty set of states (or possible worlds) St, a valuation of atomic propositions V : Prop \to 2^St, and a nonempty set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Ag \times St \to 2^{Act} defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state, and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state \[ q' = o(q, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k) \] to state q and a tuple of actions \[ \langle \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_k \rangle, \alpha_i \in d(i, q) \], that can be executed by Ag in q.

A strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to do in each possible state. Thus, a (memoryless) strategy can be represented by a function \[ s_a : St \to Act, \] such that \[ s_a(q) \in \]

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A collective strategy for a group of agents $A = \{a_1, ..., a_r\}$ is simply a tuple of strategies $s_A = (s_{a_1}, ..., s_{a_r})$, one per agent from $A$. We will denote the set of $A$'s collective strategies by $\Sigma_A$.

Also, by $s_A[a]$, we denote agent $a$'s part of the collective strategy $s_A$. Function $\text{out}(q, s_A)$ returns the set of all paths (i.e., infinite sequences of states) that may occur when coalition $A$ executes strategy $s_A$ from state $q$ onward. The semantics of cooperation modalities is defined below.

$$M, q \models \langle\langle \langle\langle\langle\langle \phi \rangle\rangle \rangle \rangle \rangle \text{iff there is } s_A \in \Sigma_A \text{ such that, for each path } \lambda \in \text{out}(q, s_A), \text{we have } M, \lambda[1] \models \phi;$$

$$M, q \models \langle\langle \langle\langle\langle \phi \rangle\rangle \rangle \rangle \text{iff there is } s_A \in \Sigma_A \text{ such that, for each path } \lambda \in \text{out}(q, s_A), \text{we have } M, \lambda[i] \models \phi \text{ for every } i \geq 0;$$

$$M, q \models \langle\langle \langle\langle\langle \psi \rangle\rangle \rangle \rangle \text{iff there is } s_A \in \Sigma_A \text{ such that, for each path } \lambda \in \text{out}(q, s_A), \text{there is } i \geq 0 \text{ for which } M, \lambda[i] \models \psi; \text{ and } M, \lambda[j] \models \psi \text{ for each } 0 \leq j < i.$$

**Example 1 (Dining Possums)**

$k$ possums are wandering in an empty house when they spot a beautifully smelling piece of cheese on the table. The table is too high to leap on, and too slippery to climb, but the possums can reach the cheese if $n \leq k$ of them stand on top of each other. Actions available to possum $i$ are: do nothing (nop), climb on top of another possum $j$ (up), climb down (dn), and pick up the cheese (grab). An example CGS for $k = n = 2$ is depicted in Figure 1. Note that not every action is enabled in every state. Also, some actions may fail (e.g., when two possums try to climb on each other at the same time). States are named to reflect the configuration, e.g., $q_0$ is the state where all possums stand on the floor with no cheese. $q_{12c}$, one where possum 1 stands on 2 holding the cheese etc.

It is easy to see that, in $q_0$, the possums can cooperate and get to the “dinner” state. However, no possum can get to dinner on its own: $M_1, q_0 \models \langle\langle \langle\langle\langle \llbracket 1 \rrbracket \rangle\rangle \rangle \rangle \text{Dinner} \land \neg \langle\langle \langle\langle\langle \llbracket 2 \rrbracket \rangle\rangle \rangle \rangle \text{Dinner}.$

### 2.2 Description Logic $\mathcal{ALCO}$

Description logics are fragments of monadic first-order logic, widely used as knowledge representation languages. Here, we use $\mathcal{ALCO}$ which extends the standard description logic $\mathcal{ALC}$ with nominals and enumeration of sets [4]. The language of concepts and formulae of $\mathcal{ALCO}$ is defined as:

$$C ::= \top \mid C^0 \mid \llbracket i \rrbracket \mid \neg C \mid C \cap C \mid \exists R.C$$

$$\varphi ::= C \subseteq C \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \land \varphi$$

where $C^0$ represents atomic concepts from a countable set $N_C = \{C_1, C_2, \ldots\}$ of concept names, $i$ is an individual from a countable set $N_I$, and $R$ a role from a countable set $N_R$. Intuitively, each concept describes a set of individuals, and concept constructors apply basic set operations on simpler concepts. The following abbreviations can be used: $\bot \equiv \neg \top$, $C \cup D \equiv \neg(\neg C \cap \neg D)$, $\llbracket i_1, \ldots, i_n \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket i_1 \rrbracket \cup \cdots \cup \llbracket i_n \rrbracket$, $C(i) \equiv \llbracket i \rrbracket \subseteq C$, and $C \equiv D \equiv (C \subseteq D \land D \subseteq C)$.

The semantics is given by a terminological interpretation $\mathcal{I} = (\Delta, \tau)$, where $\Delta$ is a nonempty set called the domain, and $\tau$ is a mapping that assigns each atomic concept $C_i$ with a subset $C_i^\mathcal{I}$ of $\Delta$, each individual name $i$ with an individual $i^\mathcal{I} \in \Delta$, and each role name $R$ with a binary relation $R^\mathcal{I}$ on $\Delta$. The interpretation is extended to other concepts as follows: $\tau^\mathcal{I} = \Delta$, $\llbracket i \rrbracket^\mathcal{I} = \{i^\mathcal{I}\}$, $\neg C^\mathcal{I} = \Delta \setminus C^\mathcal{I}$, $(C \cap D)^\mathcal{I} = C^\mathcal{I} \cap D^\mathcal{I}$, and $(\exists R.C)^\mathcal{I} = \{\delta \in \Delta \mid \exists \delta' ((\delta, \delta') \in R^\mathcal{I} \land \delta' \in C^\mathcal{I})\}$. Finally, the meaning of formulae is given by $\mathcal{I} \models C \subseteq D$ iff $C^\mathcal{I} \subseteq D^\mathcal{I}$.

**Example 2 (Possums and Cheese)**

Consider the domain $\Delta = \{pos_1, pos_2, cheese, table\}$, plus atomic concepts Possums, Free, and a binary relation On. A natural interpretation of the situation in state $q_{12}$ of model $M_1$ is: $\text{Possums}^\mathcal{I} = \{pos_1, pos_2\}$, $\text{Free}^\mathcal{I} = \{pos_1, cheese\}$, $\text{On}^\mathcal{I} = \{\langle pos_1, pos_2 \rangle, \langle \text{cheese, table} \rangle\}$. The following formula is true in this interpretation: $\exists On.(\text{Possums} \land \text{Free}) = \bot$ (nothing stands on a free possum).

### 3 Concepts and Coalitions in Alternating Time

In this section we introduce our new logic $\mathcal{ADL}$. The logic combines (restricted) first-order features of description logic, and modal approach to reasoning about agents, strategies, and impact of strategic play on evolution of the system. We overcome two limitations that made specification with Coalition Description Logic [10] cumbersome. First, $\mathcal{ADL}$ allows for reasoning about long-term temporal patterns (e.g., properties that persist over time). Second, agents and coalitions are treated in $\mathcal{ADL}$ like any other individual and concept, which allows for flexible and succinct specification of the interplay between players and their sets.

#### 3.1 Alternating-time Description Logic: Syntax

One way of seeing $\mathcal{ADL}$ is that the description logic $\mathcal{ALCO}$ provides concept descriptions and sentences that refer to properties of the current state of the system. The strategic logic $\mathcal{ATL}$ adds two kinds of modal operators. Modal sentence constructors allow to specify agents’ strategic abilities to influence the temporal evolution of the state of the system. Modal concept constructors allow to describe the set of individuals that can be influenced in a specified way. We set the sentence constructors in bold to make specifications easier to read.

Formally, the set of concepts is given by the grammar below:

$$C ::= \top \mid C_0 \mid \llbracket i \rrbracket \mid \neg C \mid C \cap C \mid \exists R.C \mid \langle C \rangle X.C \mid \langle C \rangle G.C \mid \langle C \rangle C.U.C.$$ 

That is, we extend $\mathcal{ALCO}$ concepts with ones referring to the individuals that can be forced by $C_1$ to join $C_2$ in the next step ($\langle C_1 \rangle X.C_2$), the individuals that can be forced by $C_1$ to stay in $C_2$ forever ($\langle C_1 \rangle G.C_2$), and so on. We use $\langle C_1 \rangle FC_2$ as the abbreviation for $\langle C_1 \rangle \top U.C_2$. The set of formulae of $\mathcal{ADL}$ is defined as follows (with standard abbreviations):

$$\varphi ::= C \subseteq C \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \land \varphi \mid \langle C \rangle X.\varphi \mid \langle C \rangle G.\varphi \mid \langle C \rangle \varphi U.\varphi.$$
Example 3 (Dining Possums ctd.) Example ADL formulae are: \( \langle \text{Hungry} \cap \text{Possums} \rangle \bigwedge \langle \text{Possums} \pm \perp \rangle \) (hungry possums can collaborate so that eventually no possum is hungry), and \( \langle \langle \text{Possums} \rangle \bigwedge \exists \text{in.Possums} \rangle \pm \langle \text{cheese} \rangle \) (cheese is the only object that the possums can eat, i.e., transfer it into a possum).

Note that \( CL_{ACCO} \) from [10] can be seen as the “next-time” fragment of ADL, with the additional restriction that coalitions are only specified by enumerating their members.

3.2 How to Interpret Coalitions

In the new syntax, a coalition \( C \) is just a concept. This follows the intuition that coalitions are groups of agents, i.e., sets of those individuals who act and influence the evolution of the system. Since we assume that interpretation of concepts can change as the system evolves, the same applies to coalitions. This means in particular that the actual membership in \( C \) may change while the coalition is executing its strategy. The interpretation has an organizational flavor which is very close to how humans reason about teams. We illustrate this point by a number of examples.

Example 4 (Coalitions evolve over time) Consider the following statements: “The Rolling Stones (the rock band) have had 9 no. 1 hits to date”, “FC Liverpool (the soccer team) can win the next season of Premier League”, “the European Union will implement the policy by 2015”, “researchers from Malta will keep scoring at least one ECAI paper per decade.” In all these cases, we refer to coalitions with potentially varying memberships: the Rolling Stones have been scoring hits with different bassists, drummers and lead guitarists, the EU may enhance or even shrink etc. – yet we do not mean that the policy will be implemented by the current EU states. The statement about Maltese researchers is perhaps the most significant. While the other team descriptions refer to groups that have a clearly established identity (e.g., legal identity), this one is a mere description of a variable set of people. Still, it is interpreted in the same way.

Another consequence of taking \( Ag = \Delta \) is that transitions might be labeled by infinite (and even non-enumerable) tuples of actions. To avoid that, we assume that at each moment only a finite subset of individuals is active. Note that a system can still include infinitely many agents (i.e., acting individuals), but they can only act by taking “turns” of finitely many actions.

3.3 Models

Models, concurrent game structures with terminological interpretation (CGSI), are CGS’s endowed with limited first-order features. Like in [10], interpretation of concepts and roles can vary from state to state. Also, the domain and interpretation of individual names is assumed to be constant throughout a CGSI.

Definition 1 (CGSI) A concurrent game structure with terminological interpretation is a tuple \( M = (\Delta, \text{St}, \text{Act}, \text{active}, d, o, \Sigma_C) \), where: \( \Delta \) is a nonempty domain of interpretation (that defines the set of individuals as well as agents), \( \text{St} \) is a nonempty set of states, and \( \text{active} : \text{St} \to \text{Fin}(\Delta) \setminus \emptyset \) defines the finite nonempty set of active agents at each state in \( \text{St} \). Function \( d : \text{St} \to (\Delta \rightharpoonup 2^{\text{Act}}) \setminus \emptyset \) defines actions available to agents at particular states; we assume that \( \text{dom}(d(q)) = \text{active}(q) \). We will often write \( d_a(q) \) instead of \( d(q)(a) \). The transition function \( o \) defines the next state \( q' \) given the current state \( q \) and one action per each active agent in \( q \);

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Act}_C &= \bigcup_{q \in \text{St}} d_C(q), \\
\text{dc}(q) &= \prod_{a \in \text{active}(q) \cap \forall C} d_a(q).
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 2. Possums and cheese: a part of the CGSI \( M_2 \).

Example 5 (Dining Possums ctd.) We refine the CGS from Example 1 by the conceptual structure from Example 2, plus an additional concept name Hungry to represent the set of hungry individuals and role name In for the relation of being inside. We assume that no possum is hungry at the beginning, but it becomes hungry after \( t_1 \) transitions, with \( t_1 = 1 \) for pos1 and \( t_2 = 2 \) for pos2. Moreover, a possum that has just eaten the cheese is not hungry anymore. A part of the resulting CGSI is presented in Figure 2 (we cannot present the whole graph due to lack of space).

Definition 2 (Frame) A concurrent action frame is a model without interpretation of states, i.e., \( F = (\Delta, \text{St}, \text{Act}, \text{active}, d, o) \).

Note that agents/individuals that are never active do not change the action/transition structure. Thus, we say that \( M = (\Delta', \text{St}', \text{Act}', \text{active}', d', o', \Sigma_C) \) extends \( F \) iff \( \Delta \subseteq \Delta' \), and \( \text{St}', \text{Act}', \text{active}', d', o' \) are the same as \( \text{St}, \text{Act}, \text{active}, d, o \).

3.4 Strategies

Before we give the semantic clauses for ADL, we need to redefine the notion of a collective strategy. In ATL, individual strategies are functions from states to actions, and collective strategies are tuples of individual strategies. However, in our case this would mean that we need to take potentially an infinite number of individual plans, though only finitely many of them would be used at each particular state. To avoid this, we start with the notion of a joint action of coalition \( C \): that is, a tuple of actions by the currently active members of \( C \). Formally, the sets of joint actions of \( C \) at state \( q \) and in the whole system are defined as:

\[
\text{dc}(q) = \prod_{a \in \text{active}(q) \cap \forall C} d_a(q), \quad \text{Act}_C = \bigcup_{q \in \text{St}} d_C(q).
\]

Definition 3 (Joint strategy) A joint strategy of coalition \( C \) is a function \( sc : \text{St} \to \text{Act}_C \) such that \( sc(q) \in \text{dc}(q) \). That is, \( sc \) prescribes a collective action of \( C \) in every state \( q \). The set of all such strategies is denoted by \( \Sigma_C \).

Note that we index strategies with syntactic rather than semantic entities: \( C \) is a concept that describes the coalition, and not its extension! The set of outcome paths of \( s_C \) from \( q \) is defined as:
Example 7 (Authorization) Let Perm stand for the set of permissions to be in a building, and in represent the set of agents that are currently inside. Formula $\langle L \rangle G(\langle \text{admin} \rangle F\text{Perm} \equiv \top) \land \langle \langle \text{admin} \rangle \rangle F\neg\text{Perm} \equiv \top)$ specifies that the administrator can grant and deny the permission to any agent. Moreover, $\langle L \rangle G\neg\cap \langle \langle \top \rangle \rangle X\cap \subseteq \text{Perm}$ says that agents who enter the building are only ones that have permission to do so.

We note three important differences to the specifications from [10]. First, the above formulae specify invariants of the system, i.e., properties that will hold at every possible future state. Second, the admin can grant and revoke permissions, but not necessarily in one time step. Third, the above specifications are much more succinct. In particular, they do not require the big conjunction that enumerates all agents by name.

We will now present some general patterns for specification of evolution of concepts, and examine the expressivity of ADL formally.

4.1 General Patterns of Evolution

ADL can capture the following properties of concepts (in particular, coalitions):

- $C$ remains constant in 1 step: $\text{Const}_1(C) \equiv (C \subseteq \langle L \rangle XC) \land (\langle L \rangle X(\neg C) \subseteq C)$;
- $C$ remains constant throughout every execution of the system: $\text{Const}_2(C) \equiv \langle L \rangle G\text{Const}_1(C)$;
- Losless$_1(C) \equiv C \subseteq \langle L \rangle XC$ and Losless$_2(C) \equiv \langle L \rangle G\text{Losless}_1(C)$ expressing that $C$ does not lose elements (for every possible transition);
- Grows$_1(C) \equiv \neg\langle L \rangle XC \subseteq C$ and Grows$_2(C) \equiv \langle L \rangle G\text{Grows}_1(C)$ stating that there is (always) at least one transition introducing a new element to $C$.

We will use the last two patterns in Section 5.2 to show that ADL does not have the finite model property.

4.2 Expressive Power of ADL

We use the standard notions of expressive power and distinguishing power [12].

Definition 4 (Distinguishing power) Logic $L_1$ is at least as distinguishing as $L_2$ over class of models $M$ (written $L_2 \leq L_1$) iff for every $M \in M$ and $q \in L_2$, there is $q' \in L_1$ with the same extension as $q$ in $M$. $L_1$ is strictly more distinguishing than $L_2$ iff $L_2 \leq L_1$ but not $L_1 \leq L_2$.

Definition 5 (Expressive power) Logic $L_1$ is at least as expressive as $L_2$ over class of models $M$ (written $L_2 \leq L_1$) iff there is translation TR from $L_2$ to $L_1$ such that for each $q \in L_2$ we have $M, q \models q' : i f f M, q \models TR(q')$ for all $M \in M$ and $q$ in $M$. $L_1$ is strictly more expressive than $L_2$ iff $L_2 \leq L_1$ but not $L_1 \leq L_2$.

For comparison of distinguishing and expressive power, we observe that $\text{ACCO}$ and $\text{CL}_{\text{ACCO}}$ can be interpreted over CGSI as the “present-time” resp. “next-time” sublanguages of ADL. ATL can be interpreted e.g. by translating atomic propositions $p_i$ to atomic statements $C_i \subseteq \downarrow$ in ADL (i.e., $p_i$ holds iff the corresponding concept is empty). Moreover, we interpret $\text{ACCO}$ models as single-state ADL models, and ATL models as ADL models where atomic concepts $C_1, C_2, \ldots$ “simulate” propositions $p_1, p_2, \ldots$ so that $p_i$ holds at $q$ iff the interpretation of $C_i$ at $q$ is nonempty. The proofs of the following theorems are rather easy, and we omit them to save space.
Theorem 2 ADL is strictly more expressive and strictly more distinguishing than ATL as well as ALCO.

Theorem 3 ADL is strictly more expressive and strictly more distinguishing than CL\textsubscript{ALCO}. In finite models, ADL has the same distinguishing power as CL\textsubscript{ALCO}, but strictly more expressive power.

In short, this is because ADL includes the “transitive closure” operators F, G, U that can be neither expressed in CL nor simulated in ALCO.

Theorem 4 The “next-time” fragment of ADL has the same distinguishing power, but strictly more expressive power than CL\textsubscript{ALCO}.

5 Decision Problems and Decidability

5.1 Model Checking

The (global) model checking problem asks, given a finite model M and a formula ϕ, about the exact set of states Q ⊆ St\textsubscript{M} in which ϕ holds. Below we sketch how ADL model checking can be done by the standard fixpoint model checking algorithm for ATL.

First, we compute the interpretation of concepts in ϕ by constructing an ATL model M′ where points are pairs of states and individuals from M, and concepts play the role of formulæ: St\textsubscript{M′} = St\textsubscript{M} × Δ\textsubscript{M}, Ag\textsubscript{M′} = {q ∈ St\textsubscript{M′} | active\textsubscript{M}(q), o\textsubscript{M}(q, i), α\textsubscript{M}(q, i, α)} = (o\textsubscript{M}(q, i, α), i), and V\textsubscript{M′}(C) = C\textsuperscript{2}\textsubscript{M} for all atomic concepts C in ϕ. We also use \text{next}(q, i, α) to denote the set of points in M′ that can result from executing a (possibly coalitional) action α from (q, i). For any C ⊆ St\textsubscript{M} × Δ\textsubscript{M}, let ind\textsubscript{M}(C, q) = {i ∈ C | (q, i) ∈ C}. Now, we define the pre-image function for M′ as follows: pre\textsubscript{M′}(C_1, C_2) = \{ (q, i) ∈ d\textsubscript{M′}(ind\textsubscript{M}(C, q), q) : \text{next}(q, i, α) ⊆ C_2 \}. Finally, we use the standard model checking algorithm from [3] with this new function pre to compute the (global) interpretation of all concepts in ϕ. The algorithm will run in time O(|St\textsubscript{M}||q| + |o\textsubscript{M}||q|) = O(|Δ\textsubscript{M}||q|).

The final step consists in constructing an ATL model M″ with the same states, actions and transitions as M, and the atomic subformulæ of ϕ treated as atomic propositions: V(C ⊆ D) = {q ∈ St | C\textsubscript{2}\textsuperscript{M}(q) ⊆ D\textsubscript{2}\textsuperscript{M}(q)}. Now, we simply model check ϕ in M″ with the algorithm from [3] and return the result. Part of the algorithm will also run in time O(|Δ\textsubscript{M}||q|).

Theorem 5 Model checking ADL is P-complete, and can be done in time linear w.r.t. the number of individuals and transitions in the model, and the length of the formula.

Proof. P-hardness follows from P-hardness for ATL. Inclusion and the upper bound are guaranteed by the above algorithm.

5.2 Satisfiability and Validity

Theorem 6 ADL does not have the finite model property.

Proof. We recall the patterns from Section 4.1, and observe that Losless(C) ∧ Grows(C) is satisfiable in general but unsatisfiable in finite models (there must be an infinite sequence of states q0, q1, . . . such that each (C)\textsuperscript{2}(n) strictly subsumes (C)\textsuperscript{2}(n−1)).

Conjecture 7 ADL is undecidable.

Proof idea: we reduce the Halting Problem by simulating a configuration of a Turing machine with a sequence of states that can be “browsed” by agent a1. Another agent a2 is responsible for transforming configurations according to transitions of the TM. Then, the TM halts iff a2 can reach a terminating configuration, with a1 verifying correctness of transitions on the way.

In the next section we present a more positive result which fits the practice of both DL and MAS communities well.

5.3 Realizability

The communities of description logics and MAS logics differ significantly in what they consider their “standard” decision problems. For description logics, satisfiability is most studied, motivated by the syntactic way in which knowledge bases and ontologies are usually formulated. In contrast, the MAS community mostly studies model checking, because most problem domains can be easily formalized by relational models, often emphasizing the graphical aspect of such modeling. In this section, we propose a variant of realizability\(^3\) that combines model checking in the temporal/strategic dimension with satisfiability of the description logic layer.

Definition 6 (Frame satisfiability) Frame satisfiability is the decision problem which, given a concurrent action frame F, a state q in it, and a formula ϕ, answers whether there exists a model M extending F such that M, q ⪰ ϕ.

We will show that frame satisfiability for ADL is decidable. The proof proceeds by a translation of the problem to satisfiability of CL\textsubscript{ALCO}, a decidable problem from [10]. The main idea is as follows: (1) We translate the ADL formula ϕ to a CL\textsubscript{ALCO} formula tr(ϕ) which is equivalent to ϕ on the given pointed frame F, q; (2) We characterize the pointed frame F, q by a CL\textsubscript{ALCO} formula Φ\textsubscript{F,q} that accepts only structures strategically similar [1] to F, q; (3) Frame satisfiability for F, q, ϕ is now equivalent to satisfiability of tr(ϕ) ∧ Φ\textsubscript{F,q}. We sketch the formal construction below.

Translation of the formula. Let F, q, ϕ be given (and finite). We will use the following notation: |F| is the number of states in F, Ag = \{ q ∈ St | active(q) is the set of all active individuals in F, and C = {i, i, . . . , i} | i, . . . , i ∈ Ag \} the set of all concepts that enumerate possible coalitions in Ag. We will also need an additional relational symbol FC (“fully connected”) to facilitate the translation of concepts, and require that all individuals are fully connected to every active agent from Ag by FC\textsuperscript{2} (in every state q). This can be imposed by the following formula:

\[ FC \equiv \bigwedge_{i ∈ Ag} \langle \! \langle \! \langle FC. i \rangle \! \rangle \! \rangle \equiv Τ. \]

Lemma 8 Let ifsub(A, B, C) \equiv ¬(FC. (A \setminus \neg B)) \cap C. Then, if FC\textsuperscript{2} is fully connected in the sense above, and A\textsuperscript{2} ⊆ Ag, we have that (ifsub(A, B, C))\textsuperscript{2} = C\textsuperscript{2} if A\textsuperscript{2} ⊆ B\textsuperscript{2} and 0 otherwise.

We translate the subformulæ and concepts in ϕ recursively as below.\(^4\) We use the fact that a successful strategy can be constructed for

\(^3\) The term refers to a class of decision problems where the input is a formula and a part of a model. Then, realizability returns “yes” if there exists a model that extends the part and makes the formula true.

\(^4\) For lack of space, we only show translations for the “next” and “always” strategic operators. The case of “until” is analogous, and tr distributes over all the other operators.
Characterizing the frame. Let $AS(\varphi)$ be the set of atomic sentences in $\varphi$. We add a concept symbol $State$ that will represent the current state of the frame. Now, we encode the following properties:

- **Frame completeness**: $\Phi_{comp} \equiv \forall q \in St_F. State \equiv \{q\};$
- **Uniqueness of state**: $\Phi_{uniq} \equiv \forall q',q \in St_F. \neg (\{q\} \equiv \{q'\});$
- **Preservation of atomic properties**: $\Phi_{at}(q,\psi) \equiv ((State \equiv \{q\}) \land \psi) \rightarrow \langle\langle G\rangle\rangle G((State \equiv \{q\}) \land \psi),$ $\Phi_{at} \equiv \forall q \in St_F \forall \psi \in \text{Prop}(\text{State},\psi);$
- **Characterization of one-step transitions.** Let $\text{Next}^+(q,A) = \{Q \subseteq St_F \mid \exists a \in da(q).Q = \text{next}(q,A)\}$, i.e., $\text{Next}^+(q,A)$ collects all possible outcome sets for A’s actions in q. Also, let $\text{Next}^-(q,A) = \{Q \subseteq St_F \mid \exists a \in da(q).Q \supseteq \text{next}(q,A)\}$ collect outcome sets that cannot be enforced by A. Now: $\Phi_{\text{trans}}(q,A) \equiv \forall Q \subseteq St_F. \neg (Q \subseteq \text{next}(q,A)) \rightarrow (\langle\langle G\rangle\rangle X(\text{State} \subseteq Q), \Phi_{\text{trans}} \equiv \forall Q \subseteq St_F. (\text{State} \equiv \{q\}) \land \Phi_{\text{next}}(q,A).$

Now, formula $\Phi_{FG} \equiv (\text{State} \equiv \{q_0\}) \land (\langle\langle G\rangle\rangle \Phi_{\text{comp}} \land \Phi_{uniq} \land \Phi_{at} \land \Phi_{\text{trans}})$ can be used to characterize $F_G$ at $q_0$ modulo the strategic bisimulation from [1].

Lemma 10 Let $M$ be a CGSI that extends $F$ with a valuation of $AS(\varphi)$. Then, every pointed model satisfying $\Phi_{FG}$ is strategically bisimilar to $M$, $q_0$ wrt $AS(\varphi)$. In consequence, all pointed models satisfying $\Phi_{FG}$ share the same formulas over $AS(\varphi)$ as $M$, $q_0$.

Wrap-up. By Lemmas 9 and 10, we obtain the following result.

Theorem 11 $\text{ADL}$ formula $\varphi$ is satisfiable in pointed frame $F$, $q_0$ iff the formula $\text{tr}(\Phi_{FG}) \land \text{tr}(\Phi_C) \land \text{tr}(\varphi)$ is $\text{CL}_{\text{ADL}}$ satisfiable.

Corollary 12 $\text{ADL}$ frame satisfiability is decidable.

6 Conclusions and Related Work

In this paper, we propose a product-style combination of strategic logic and description logic. We believe that the resulting framework is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it is very expressive and allows for neat and succinct specification of operational concepts that persist in time, or can be enforced through a long-term strategic behavior. Second, we propose a semantics of strategies where the executing team can vary in the runtime—which is a concept very natural for everyday reasoning, but noticeably absent in formal theories of interaction. Thirdly, we propose a variant of realizability that combines traditional approaches to decision problems in the MAS and DL communities, and show that it can be a worthwhile alternative to both satisfiability and model checking.

Similar ideas have been discussed in a number of papers. A combination of DL and Coalition logic was studied in [11, 10]. Another MAS/DL combination—of the branching-time logic CTL and $\text{ACCL}$—was discussed in [7]. The idea that membership in a coalition can vary throughout execution of a strategy was mentioned in [5], but never formalized or explored further. Also, referring to coalitions by intensional descriptions was used in [2], but there it was interpreted by a set of (constant) teams, and not a single (but variable) team like in our case. Finally, realizability is a well known problem in temporal logic (cf. e.g. [9]) but the setup is different. There, a part of the temporal structure is usually missing, while we assume that only the valuation of atomic terms and formulae must be synthesized.

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